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I. THE AMERICAN HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM 
 Who should be providing mortgage credit to 
American households?  Given that the 
residential mortgage market is a ten-trillion-
dollar one, the answer we come up with had 
better be right, or we may suffer another 
brutal financial crisis sooner than we would 
like.  Indeed, the stakes are as high as they 
                     
 * Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.  This Article 
draws from earlier work of mine, including a comment letter 
to the Federal Housing Finance Agency, Comment on the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency’s Strategic Plan:  Fiscal Years 2013-
2017, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (June 18, 2012), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2086514, 
as well as assorted articles and blog posts. 
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were in the Great Depression when the 
foundation of our current system was first 
laid down. 
 Unfortunately, the housing finance experts 
of the 1930s seemed to have a greater clarity 
of purpose when designing their housing 
finance system.  Part of the problem today is 
that debates over the housing finance system 
have been muddled by broader ideological 
battles and entrenched special interests, as 
well as by plain old inertia and the fear of 
change.  Instead of merely responding to the 
latest proposal coming out of Washington, 
D.C., it is worth taking a step back to 
evaluate the full range of options available 
to us.  After all, whatever course we decide 
upon will shape the housing market for 
generations to come. 
 In For the Protection of Investors and the 
Public:  Why Fannie Mae’s Mortgage-Backed 
Securities Should Be Subject to the Disclosure 
Requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, 
Brent Horton argues that “the best way to 
reduce risk taking at Fannie Mae is to subject 
its MBS offerings to the disclosure 
requirements of the Securities Act of 1933.”1  
I disagree.  While disclosure obviously has an 
important role to play in the regulation of 
publicly traded companies, the problems 
inherent in Fannie Mae’s structure are greater 
than those that increased disclosure can 
address. 
 Horton’s article mainly addresses Fannie 
Mae, but my views apply equally to its sibling 
corporation, Freddie Mac.  Fannie and Freddie 
are commonly referred to as government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs).  They each have 
                     
 1. Brent J. Horton, For the Protection of Investors and 
the Public:  Why Fannie Mae’s Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Should Be Subject to the Disclosure Requirements of the 
Securities Act of 1933, 89 TUL. L. REV. __ (2014). 
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a dual mandate that is built into the special 
charters given to them by Congress.  On the 
one hand, they are supposed to maximize 
shareholder value as privately owned 
companies.  On the other, they are supposed to 
increase home ownership opportunities for low- 
and moderate-income households and residents 
of underserved communities.  These two 
missions have been in tension with each other 
over the years.  The GSE model resulted in 
massive losses for the two companies during 
the financial crisis.  Taxpayers bore these 
losses until the housing markets recovered, 
lifting the GSEs along with them.  In our 
postcrisis world, we are left with this 
question:  what should be done with Fannie and 
Freddie? 
II. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE WITH FANNIE AND FREDDIE? 
 There are four broad positions regarding 
the appropriate role of Fannie and Freddie in 
the housing finance market.  First, Fannie and 
Freddie are generally doing the job that they 
were designed to do, although their powers and 
those of their regulators should be tweaked.  
Second, Fannie and Freddie are generally doing 
their job, but they do not do enough to 
promote their affordable housing goals.  
Third, Fannie and Freddie should be 
nationalized because the federal government 
has taken on most of the risk associated with 
them already.  And finally, Fannie and Freddie 
should be privatized because they pose a 
systemic risk to the financial system. 
 This Response takes the fourth position.  
In particular, it argues that the GSEs’ 
special relationship with the federal 
government should be terminated and the two 
companies should be privatized.  Until they 
entered conservatorship, this position had 
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been considered a political nonstarter, 
particularly because Fannie and Freddie have 
many allies in the Democratic and Republican 
parties.  Due to recent events, this is now 
one of the options on the table for a 
postconservatorship Fannie and Freddie. 
A. Tweaking the Status Quo 
 One taking the first view—that Fannie and 
Freddie are generally doing the job that they 
were designed to do—might argue that we should 
just come to terms with the fact that the 
government is already enmeshed in private 
markets and there is no reason to do things 
any differently in the context of housing 
finance.  As such, there is no need to rock 
the boat when it comes to companies that are 
as enmeshed with the federal government as are 
Fannie and Freddie. 
 Horton himself takes this view, arguing 
that politics is the art of the attainable or, 
in the words of Otto von Bismarck, of “the 
next best.” 2   Horton writes, “The next best 
does not require dismantling Fannie Mae; the 
next best is to require Fannie Mae to inform 
investors—and the public—more about the 
mortgages it is purchasing and securitizing.”3  
His proposal thus joins a long line of reform 
proposals that seek to tweak the status quo 
and argue that there is no need to extricate 
the federal government from its complicated 
relationship with Fannie or Freddie. 
 If Horton had written this article before 
the financial crisis, before Fannie and 
Freddie had gone into conservatorship, I might 
find his proposal more intriguing.  But the 
                     
 2. Id. at __ (quoting Otto von Bismarck, quoted in THE 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS 530 (Margaret Miner & Hugh 
Rawson eds., 2d ed. 2006)). 
 3. Id. at __. 
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political winds have shifted substantially, 
such that “the next best” thing is 
qualitatively better than increased 
disclosure.  The crisis has given us 
permission to think more broadly about what 
our housing finance system should look like 
going forward. 
B. Increasing Fannie’s Role in Developing 
Affordable Housing 
 Horton is also sympathetic to the argument 
that Fannie and Freddie are essential in 
efforts to place home ownership “within reach 
of all.” 4   Some argue that the GSEs’ dual-
mandate model is valuable because it ensures 
that private capital has a duty to serve low- 
and moderate-income households.  Indeed, much 
of the opposition to GSE reform from Democrats 
in Congress arises from this concern over the 
future of the “duty to serve.”  Private 
capital has a history of overlooking certain 
segments of the mortgage market, and a duty to 
serve would ensure that it does not do so 
going forward.  Democrats in particular have 
also favored the funding of a housing trust 
fund to provide capital dollars for the 
construction of affordable housing for low-
income households. 
 These two policy objectives—the duty to 
serve and a housing trust fund—have encouraged 
some affordable housing advocates to favor 
some variant of the status quo, because the 
status quo can clearly deliver those two 
objectives.  The problem with this approach is 
the same as with the first:  Fannie and 
Freddie’s dual mandates are in inherent 
tension with each other, and no tweak can 
resolve that tension.  Indeed, the precrisis 
                     
 4. Id. at __ (quoting WALT WHITMAN, DEMOCRATIC VISTAS AND OTHER 
PAPERS 172 (Walter Scott 1888)). 
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GSEs put the interests of shareholders and 
management over the public interest.  The GSEs 
also were some of the most politically 
powerful entities in Washington, D.C.  
Stronger medicine than mere tweaks is needed 
to protect the nation from restoring the GSEs 
to their precrisis size and power and also the 
real risks that are attendant in doing so. 
C. Nationalization 
 In recent years, the federal government has 
insured or guaranteed 80%-90% of new 
residential mortgages through its 
instrumentality, the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA), as well as through 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for which it is 
the conservator.  Some believe that the 
federal government is the only entity that can 
provide mortgage credit in a stable way, and 
history is arguably on their side.  Since the 
Great Depression, when the Home Owners Loan 
Corporation, the FHA, and Fannie Mae were 
created, the federal government has had a 
central role in the housing finance market.  
Some also believe that there is not enough 
private capital to replace the government-
guaranteed capital in the market, even if 
there was sufficient political will to do so.  
Nationalization proposals are just seen as the 
natural extension of this state of affairs. 
 A variety of scholars and think tanks have 
proposed versions of a nationalized or 
partially nationalized housing finance system 
with a utilitylike securitizer at its heart.  
The bipartisan Johnson-Crapo housing finance 
reform bill contained aspects of a utilitylike 
securitizer.5  Bills like this appear dead in 
                     
5  Housing Finance Reform and Taxpayer Protection Act 
of 2014, S.1217, 113th Cong. § 321-327 (2014). 
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the water, however, with congressional reform 
not expected for years. 
 The GSEs’ regulator, the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA), has taken some steps in 
the direction of nationalization with its 
common securitization platform.  This platform 
seeks to combine the back-office functions of 
Fannie and Freddie into one entity.  This 
regulatory initiative may have more impact in 
the long run than those of the current do-
nothing Congress.  Whether led by regulators 
or Congress, if GSE reform settles on a single 
guarantor model, it is likely that model will 
be regulated like a utility company. 
 This approach gives up on the notion that 
the private sector should be in the lead 
position of evaluating mortgages and bearing 
the risk of loss from underwriting them.  This 
is inconsistent with what we know of how 
markets should work.  Generally, it is 
considered appropriate for the government to 
step into the market if there is a market 
failure.  Market failures in the housing 
markets typically fall into two categories:  
those caused by excessive information costs 
and those caused by uninsurable risks.6  Given 
that market players have access to an 
extraordinarily detailed level of information 
about borrowers (reduced to a simple FICO 
score) and homes (through mandatory 
appraisals), a market failure would appear to 
have to result from uninsurable risks.  As 
noted, some have argued that there is not 
enough private capital to support the entire 
                     
 6. David Reiss, Landlords of Last Resort:  Should the 
Government Subsidize the Mortgages of Privately-Owned, Small 
Multifamily Buildings?, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 940 (2009) 
(quoting James R. Follain & Edward J. Szymanoski, A Framework 
for Evaluating Government’s Evolving Role in Multifamily 
Mortgage Markets, 1 CITYSCAPE:  J. POL’Y DEV. & RES. 151, 154 
(1995)). 
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U.S. mortgage market.  Even if that were true, 
however, there is no theoretical reason why 
private capital should not be in a first-loss 
position for large swaths of that market.  And 
it is important to remember what is at stake:  
if government funds are in the first-loss 
position, then taxpayers are stuck holding the 
bag at the end of each bust. 
D. Privatization 
 Some, including me, believe that private 
capital can, and should, take a bigger role in 
the provision of residential mortgage finance.  
There is some question as to how much capacity 
private capital has, given the size of the 
residential mortgage market.  But there is no 
doubt that private capital can do more than 
the measly share of new mortgages that it has 
been originating in recent years.  The long-
term health of the U.S. housing finance system 
is best assured by having private capital 
assume as much of the credit risk as it can 
responsibly handle.  It follows that Fannie 
and Freddie’s functions should be transferred 
to the private sector pursuant to a carefully 
planned transition. 
III. A HOUSING FINANCE SYSTEM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 
 A housing finance system for the twenty-
first century should achieve three goals:  
(1) put private capital in a first-loss 
position, (2) ensure that the federal 
government can act as a lender of last resort 
for the mortgage market, and (3) maintain an 
ongoing role for the federal government in the 
segments of the market that private capital 
does not sufficiently fund. 
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A. Private Capital 
 The government’s goal for the private 
housing finance market should be to provide 
sustainable credit to the wide swath of 
borrowers who have ready access to private 
financial institutions.  The private housing 
finance industry’s share of the conforming 
market should expand over time as it 
demonstrates its ability to responsibly 
increase the availability of sustainable 
credit.  This can be achieved by a gradual 
lowering of the conforming loan limits that 
are applicable to Fannie and Freddie. 
 This private capital should also be subject 
to consumer protection regulation to ensure 
that it is not put to predatory uses.  The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has rules 
in place to provide such consumer protection.  
It will also be important to continue to 
monitor whether low- and moderate-income 
households and neighborhoods are receiving 
sufficient amounts of mortgage credit.  The 
federal government may need to take additional 
steps to overcome any market failure in 
submarkets in order to ensure that all 
communities have access to a vibrant mortgage 
market. 
 While it is important to make residential 
credit broadly available, lenders will be 
doing borrowers no favors if their loans are 
not sustainable.  The federal government 
should come up with a metric that balances 
responsible underwriting with access to 
credit.  Developing a metric is important 
because of the pressure to increase access to 
residential mortgage credit by a range of 
players—consumer advocates, lenders, and 
politicians, to name just a few.  But credit 
that cannot be sustained by home owners leads 
to mortgage default and foreclosure.  Home 
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owners should not be taking out mortgages with 
payments that they cannot consistently make 
year in and year out. 
B. Liquidity 
 The FHA, along with the rest of the 
government-supported sector of the housing 
finance market, should always be ready to 
provide liquidity during a financial crisis.  
This means that the government’s housing 
finance infrastructure should be able to ramp 
up almost immediately if private credit were 
to disappear overnight. 
C. Affordable and Sustainable Mortgages 
 The FHA should continue to provide 
mortgages to first-time home buyers and low- 
and moderate-income borrowers.  But otherwise, 
we should look to private capital to price 
risk and fund mortgages to the extent that it 
can do so.  And as with privately funded 
loans, the FHA should ensure that the 
mortgages they originate are sustainable for 
their borrowers. 
 These three components—appropriately-
regulated private capital in a first-loss 
position, the federal government as a lender 
of last resort, and a government role in the 
segment of the market that private capital 
does not sufficiently fund—give us a housing 
finance system that may last through the end 
of the twenty-first century. 
IV. THE RISK OF DOING NOTHING 
 Horton rightly notes that the reform of 
GSEs like Fannie is the biggest “piece of 
unfinished business” left over from the 
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financial crisis.7  Our do-nothing Congress is 
aware that the residential mortgage market we 
create today will likely be the one our 
grandchildren use.  Congress is also aware 
that we have, at most, one chance to get it 
right.  We can only hope that the political 
will to reform the GSEs can overcome Congress’ 
deep ideological divide before we hit our next 
housing finance crisis, whatever and whenever 
that might be. 
 And yet, there is no question that the 
federal government has not moved with 
sufficient speed to establish a workable 
infrastructure for the housing finance market.  
Some commentators identify benefits of a slow 
approach—time to get consensus, time to get 
rules right, time for trial and error before 
committing for the long term.  Few identify 
the costs of regulatory uncertainty—failure to 
get buy-in for capital-intensive ventures, 
atrophy of existing resources, and limited 
investor interest. 
 I believe that there is a good chance that 
five or ten years from now, Fannie and Freddie 
will be in the midst of another bailout.  This 
next crisis will be directly caused by the 
executive and legislative branches of the 
federal government.  Members of those branches 
may say, “Nobody could have known that this 
crisis was going to happen, nobody is at 
fault.”  That will not be true, but nobody 
will be punished in any case.  That is because 
the crisis will result from inaction, the most 
fearsome of government flaws. 
 Fannie and Freddie have been in a state of 
limbo since they entered conservatorship in 
                     
 7. Horton, supra note 1, at __ (quoting Nick Timiraos, 
Five Years Later, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Remain Unfinished 
Business, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 6, 2013, 8:04 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323423804
579022672911329450). 
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2008.  The conservatorships have gone on for 
far too long for such complex entities to 
remain well-run.  All sorts of operational 
risks are likely to be cropping up in the two 
companies as employees sit around (or walk out 
the door) waiting for Congress to act. 
 Fannie and Freddie’s regulator, the Federal 
Housing Finance Agency (FHFA), can 
administratively move housing finance reform 
forward to some extent on its own.  To the 
extent that it does so, it needs to determine 
how safety and soundness are best balanced 
with access to credit.  Federal housing 
finance policy typically goes off the rails 
when those two goals get mixed up.  The FHFA 
should ensure that FHFA’s safety and soundness 
goals are clearly set forth and that other 
goals for Fannie and Freddie are designed to 
work in harmony with them. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 Fundamentally, the federal government needs 
to determine what the housing finance system 
should look like for the twenty-first century.  
There is not one right answer to that 
question.  There is also an ideological 
component to the answer.  I believe that a 
broad swath of the populace favors a system in 
which private capital (albeit heavily 
regulated private capital) should be put at 
risk for a large swath of residential 
mortgages.  Moreover, I believe that there is 
a broad consensus that the taxpayer should 
only be on the hook for major liquidity crises 
and for initiatives that provide home 
ownership opportunities to low- and moderate-
income households.  I believe that a broad 
swath of the electorate would stand behind 
such a plan whether it was initiated by the 
Obama Administration or by Congress. 
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 Too much of the debate about our housing 
finance system is driven by fear of change, 
often expressed as concerns about the 
transition from our current system to whatever 
comes next.  But we need to make clear what we 
want from our new system and then design it 
and the transition to get there.  If we do 
not, we will end up with the “next, next best” 
option.  We should do better than that. 
